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313 
PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
CONSTITUTIONS: SPANISH COLONIAL LAW 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CÁDIZ 
M.C. MIROW∗ 
The Spanish Constitution of Cádiz of 18121 (“Constitution”) has 
recently attracted the attention of constitutionalists and legal historians for 
its role as an essential step in the development of both world and Latin 
American constitutionalism. The interest in the Constitution has increased 
due to its 2012 bicentennial and the rolling independence bicentennials of 
the Latin American republics. There is a well-documented connection 
between the events leading to the Constitution’s implementation 
throughout the Spanish Empire and both initial Latin American 
independence movements and subsequent constitutional texts and 
practices.2 There are fewer studies, however, concerning the pivotal role 
the extant Spanish colonial law (derecho indiano) played in these events.3 
 
 
 ∗
 Professor of Law and Associate Dean of International & Graduate Studies, FIU College of 
Law, Miami; Investigador Honorario, Escuela Libre de Derecho, Mexico City, Mexico. J.D., Cornell 
Law School, Ph.D., Cambridge University; Ph.D., Leiden Unversity. I thank Marisol Floren for her 
bibliographic help and Kristin Drecktrah and Alejandro Gutiérrez for their research assistance. I am 
grateful to the University of Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies for a research travel grant 
and to Richard Phillips who assisted my research at the Latin American Collection of the Smathers 
Library. This paper was presented at the XVII Congreso Instituto Internacional de Historia del 
Derecho Indiano (Puebla, Mexico) in September, 2010. I thank Dr. Andrés Lira González, Dr. Juan 
Pablo Salazar Andreu, Dr. Óscar Cruz Barney, Mtra. Claudia Juárez de la Rosa, Alejandro G. 
Escobedo Rojas, and Mariana Durán Márquez and the other members of the Comité Organizador of 
the conference for their hospitality. 
 1. The name Constitution of Cádiz comes from the city where this Spanish constitution was 
promulgated, Cádiz, in Andalusia, Spain. For a description of this vibrant trading city on the Atlantic 
coast of Spain during the period presented in this Article, see RAMÓN SOLÍS, EL CÁDIZ DE LAS 
CORTES: LA VIDA EN LA CIUDAD EN LOS AÑOS DE 1810, at 1813 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., MANUEL CHUST, LA CUESTIÓN NACIONAL AMERICANA EN LAS CORTES DE CÁDIZ 
(1810–1814) (1999); RAFAEL ESTRADA MICHEL, MONARQUÍA Y NACIÓN ENTRE CÁDIZ Y NUEVA 
ESPAÑA: EL PROBLEMA DE LA ARTICULACIÓN POLÍTICA DE LAS ESPAÑAS ANTE LA REVOLUCIÓN 
LIBERAL Y LA EMANCIPACIÓN AMERICANA (2006); Rafael Estrada Michel, Los Reinos de Indias y la 
Nueva Nación Española, 22 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 209–36 (2010); IVANA 
FRASQUET, LAS CARAS DEL ÁGUILA; DEL LIBERALISMO GADITANO A LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL 
MEXICANA (1820–1824) (Universitat Jaume I) (2008); Eduardo Herrera, Los Orígenes del 
constitucionalismo en Iberoamérica, in AMÉRICA Y LA HISPANIDAD: HISTORIA DE UN FENÓMENO 
CUTURAL (Antonio Cañellas ed., 2011); Abelardo Levaggi, Constitución de 1812: Presencia 
Latinoamericana, in LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1812: REFLEXIONES JURÍDICAS EN LA VÍSPERA DEL 
BICENTENARIO 57, 57–81 (Juan María Terradillos Basoco ed., 2006); MARTA LORENTE SARIÑENA, LA 
NACIÓN Y LAS ESPAÑAS: REPRESENTACIÓN Y TERRITORIO EN EL CONSTITUCIONALISMO GADITANO 
(2010); JAIME E. RODRÍGUEZ O., THE INDEPENDENCE OF SPANISH AMERICA (1998). Recent volumes 
of the ANUARIO MEXICANO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO and RECHTSGESCHICHTE are dedicated to this 
topic. See 22 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO (2010) and 16 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 
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Instead of exploring the effect produced by the Constitution in 
subsequent constitutional developments, this study examines the way 
existing law informed the constitutional process in Cádiz and shaped the 
Constitution itself. More specifically, this article examines the role and 
function of Spanish colonial law as related to both the constitutional 
debates and the text itself.4 It seeks to explore the important place Spanish 
colonial law had in the Constitution’s construction, the way it limited the 
scope of the Constitution, and the way the Constitution, in turn, shaped 
Spanish colonial law. 
Spanish colonial law’s effect on the Constitution and in the Cortes5 has 
three distinct aspects. First, Spanish colonial law served as a common 
 
 
(2010), both with numerous contributions by experts in the field. The Constitution of Cádiz has also 
recently attracted the attention of legal scholars in the United States. See, e.g., José Antonio Cheibub, 
Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1707, 1710, 1716 (2011); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism through the 
Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 24 n.153 (2006). For more on the promulgation 
of the Constitution in Florida and Cuba, see M.C. Mirow, The Constitution of Cádiz in Florida, 24 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 271–330 (2012); M.C. Mirow, The Constitution of Cádiz in Cuba and Florida, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF CÁDIZ AND ITS IMPACT IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD (Scott Eastman & Natalia 
Sobrevilla eds., forthcoming 2013). 
 3. See, e.g., Andrés Botero Bernal, La Visión del Derecho y los Rastros del Derecho Indiano en 
las Constituciones Independistas Neogranadinas de entre 1811 y 1815, in 2 ACTAS DEL DECIMOSEXTO 
CONGRESO DEL INSTITUTO INTERNACIONAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO INDIANO (Alejandro Guzmán 
Brito ed., 2010); Alfonso García Gallo, El Derecho Indiano y la Independencia de América, 50 
REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS 141–61 (1951). For studies concerning Spain’s unwritten 
constitution before the Constitution of Cádiz (“the Constitution”), see EDUARDO MARTIRÉ, DOS 
LECCIONES DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ARGENTINO: LOS DERECHOS DE LAS PERSONAS EN INDIAS, 
GARANTÍAS Y LIBERTADES 11–35 (1989); JOSÉ MARÍA PORTILLO VALDÉS, REVOLUCIÓN DE NACIÓN: 
ORÍGENES DE LA CULTURA CONSTITUCIONAL EN ESPAÑA, 1780–1812, at 13–155 (2000); DINÁMICAS 
DE ANTIGUO RÉGIMEN Y ORDEN CONSTITUCIONAL: REPRESENTACIÓN, JUSTICIA Y ADMINISTRACIÓN 
EN IBEROAMÉRICA SIGLOS XVIII–XIX (Marco Bellingeri ed., 2000). For the term “derecho indiano,” 
see infra note 4. 
 4. Translating derecho indiano into English is particularly problematic. There is a strong 
argument that it is best left untranslated. However, “Spanish colonial law,” the translation used in this 
text, captures the essence of the term and improves accessibility for English-speaking readers. Even 
the Library of Congress classification system struggles with the term, as it erroneously ascribes books 
on derecho indiano to “Indians of South America —Legal status, laws, etc. —History,” and “Indians 
of Central America —Legal status, laws, etc. —History.” See, e.g., Antonio Dougnac Rodríguez, 
Manual de Historia del Derecho Indiano, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ONLINE CATALOGUE (1994), 
available at http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&ti=1,1&SEQ=20120213153837&Sear 
ch%5FArg=antonio%20dougnac%20derecho%20indiano&Search%5FCode=GKEY%5E%2A&CNT=
100&PID=6RM5GKxo6kvCPE8WaUVBeyYE0-X5&SID=1. Although some aspects of derecho 
indiano have to do with native populations (indios), there is a great deal of it that has nothing to do 
with “indios.” Viviana Kluger, Spanish Colonial Law, in 5 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LEGAL HISTORY 290–291 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009); M.C. Mirow, South and Central America: 
Overview, in 5 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 284–85 (Stanley N. Katz 
ed., 2009).  
 5. The Cortes were the quasi-representative bodies that gathered in southern Spain, usually 
Cádiz, as a governing bodies of the Spanish Empire loyal to the absent King Fernando VII after the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/7
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knowledge base concerning the status of the Americas, their institutions, 
and their relation to peninsular Spain.6 Second, Spanish colonial law 
served as a source to resolve questions of law during the constitutional 
drafting process.7 Third, Spanish colonial law was at the forefront of a 
broader debate concerning the Constitution’s historicity and the extent to 
which the Constitution’s text merely affirmed pre-existing institutions, 
rights, concepts, and structures into a new written text.8 
To understand fully the interaction between the Constitution and 
Spanish colonial law, the two must first be understood separately. The 
Constitution is well known by historians of political thought, 
constitutional law, and nineteenth-century liberalism.9 It is often 
considered one of the first liberal constitutions in Europe and in America. 
Like the United States Constitution, the Constitution of Cádiz had great 
influence during the drafting of the first constitutions of the Americas 
during the independence period.10 This document, consisting of 384 
articles in about forty pages of text, established sovereignty in the nation 
and not in the king. The Roman Catholic religion received substantial 
preference under the Constitution, and the practice of other religions was 
prohibited.11 The text included provisions that evinced a liberal bias: 
representative elections at multiple levels of government,12 restrictions on 
the power of the king,13 rights to property,14 and rights for the criminally 
accused.15 Because the Constitution was drafted by deputies representing 
not only peninsular Spain but also the American provinces, it was the first 
 
 
Napoleonic invasion of Spain. The first convocation of the Cortes led to the General and Extraordinary 
Cortes (Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias) on September 24, 1810. The General and Extraordinary 
Cortes drafted and promulgated the Constitution of Cádiz. Subsequently, Cortes was held under the 
provisions of the Constitution of Cádiz and, thus, was no longer “extraordinary.” M.C. Mirow, Visions 
of Cádiz: The Constitution of 1812 in Historical and Constitutional Thought, in 53 STUDIES IN LAW, 
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 63–64, 76 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010) [hereinafter Mirow, Visions]. 
 6. See infra notes 22–53 and accompanying text.  
 7. See infra notes 54–79 and accompanying text.  
 8. See LORENTE, supra note 2, at 12–20; Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 66–67. 
 9. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 59–81. For an English translation of the Constitution see 
M.C. MIROW, FLORIDA’S FIRST CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTION OF CÁDIZ: INTRODUCTION, 
TRANSLATION, AND TEXT (2012). 
 10. See RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at x, xi, 59, 69, 70–74.  
 11. C.E. art. 12, Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain).  
 12. Id. arts. 27–103. 
 13. Id. art. 172. 
 14. Id. art. 4 (“The Nation is obliged to preserve and protect by wise and just laws, civil liberty, 
property, and the other legitimate rights of all the individuals who make up the Nation.”). 
 15. For more on the rights of the accused, see M.C. Mirow, The Legality Principle and the 
Constitution of Cádiz, in FROM THE JUDGE’S ARBITRIUM TO THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE: LEGISLATION 
AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 189–205 (Georges Martyn, Anthony Musson & Heikki 
Pihlajamäki eds., 2013). 
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truly transatlantic constitution, and the American influences on the 
Constitution and vice-versa have been a subject of substantial speculation, 
historical scholarship, and debate.16 
Because the exact status of the Americas in the Spanish Empire was 
not entirely clear—the Americas could arguably be seen as completely 
separate from Spain, or as incorporated provinces of the Spanish Empire—
Spanish colonial law oscillated between law best characterized as strict 
imperial law, and that which falls closer to special local legislation. The 
peculiarities of government and legislation in the Americas were 
highlighted in the eighteenth century in the works of Manuel Joseph de 
Ayala and Benito de la Mata Linares, for example.17 In Spanish colonial 
law, we find a ship anchored in the ius commune tradition, fitted with the 
two grand sails of the Recopilación of 1680 and Juan Solórzano Pereira’s 
Política Indiana, with a myriad of local orders and rules expedited by 
audiencias, viceroys, and other local authorities, all fitted out for the 
unique situations and challenges of the Americas.18 The Recopilación, 
referred to throughout this study, was divided into nine books roughly 
dealing with the following subject matters: (1) the church and clergy; 
(2) the Council of the Indies and courts; (3) the viceroy and military 
matters; (4) discovering and populating new lands; (5) royal officials and 
their jurisdiction; (6) indigenous populations and their labor; (7) moral and 
criminal offences; (8) finances; and (9) the Board of Trade and American 
commerce.19 The diversity of sources contributing to Spanish colonial law, 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., CHUST, supra note 2; ESTRADA, supra note 2; FRASQUET, supra note 2; LORENTE, 
supra note 2; M.C. Mirow, The Constitution of Cádiz in Florida, supra note 2; MARIE LAURE RIEU-
MILLAN, LOS DIPUTADOS AMERICANOS EN LAS CORTES DE CÁDIZ (IGUALIDAD O INDEPENDENCIA) 
(1990); MARIO RODRIGUEZ, THE CÁDIZ EXPERIMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 1808 TO 1826 (1978). 
 17. VICTOR TAU ANZOÁTEQUI, ¿QUÉ FUE EL DERECHO INDIANO? 23 (3d ed. 2005). 
 18. For the relationship of the ius commune to Spanish and Spanish colonial law, see JAVIER 
BARRIENTOS GRANDÓN, LA CULTURA JURÍDICA EN LA NUEVA ESPAÑA (1993); ANICETO MASFERRER, 
SPANISH LEGAL TRADITION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY OUTLINE 162–81, 224–31, 241–55 
(2009); M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
SPANISH AMERICA 34–53 (2004). For a description of this Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las 
Indias of 1680 and Solórzano’s Política Indiana, see MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra, at 47–48, 
50. 
The public law of the Indies was successfully compiled in 1680 as the Recopilación de Leyes 
de las Indias. . . . Providing the rules for government structures and institutions, this work 
was consulted and cited frequently, and it has been the subject of numerous studies. In 
enacting the Recopilación of 1680, Charles II ordered that earlier, contradictory laws no 
longer held authority. . . . Its sources are laws emanating from the Spanish crown and 
peninsuar royal bodies, but not from the colonial audiencias, viceroys, consulados, or 
cabildos. The first edition was published in 1681 with reissues in 1756, 1774, and 1791. . . . It 
is divided into nine books and 218 titles.  
Id. at 47. 
 19. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 18, at 48.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/7
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the multiple provincial provisions, and the variety of local customs leads 
to an understanding that perhaps there was not one uniform system of 
Spanish colonial law.20 Thus, one may think in the plural of Spanish 
colonial laws. Despite the increasing centralization within the Spanish 
Empire leading up to the century of the Cortes of Cádiz, local variations 
continued and the laws and customs of indigenous communities also 
continued to be expressed as applicable legal norms.21 
I. SPANISH COLONIAL LAW AS A COMMON BASE OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 
One does not need to read much of the Constitution to realize that it has 
much to do with America, or Ultramar, as Spaniards then called it. The 
first twelve words of the Constitution are enough: Article I famously 
states, “The Spanish Nation is the reunion of all Spaniards of both 
hemispheres.”22 Article 10 reinforces the continental continuity, stating 
that the territory of Spain explicitly includes, in this order: New Spain, 
New Galicia, the Yucatan, Guatemala, the Provinces of the East, the 
Provinces of the West, Cuba, the Floridas, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, 
New Granada, Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and Rio de la Plata.23 Other articles 
make it clear that the Cortes of Cádiz never stopped thinking about 
America’s place within the Spanish Empire and within the text of the 
Constitution. The ideas of “both hemispheres,” America, or Ultramar, are 
found in articles dealing with citizenship,24 the formation of the Cortes,25 
elections at the city (parroquia), district (partido), and province 
(provincia) levels,26 the composition of the Permanent Deputation of the 
Cortes, a kind of standing committee when the Cortes were not in 
session,27 the creation of an Office of Overseas,28 the composition of the 
Council of State,29 the jurisdiction of the tribunals to hear appeals in the 
region,30 and the power of the deputations to oversee public works.31 
 
 
 20. TAU, supra note 17, at 20–38. 
 21. Id. at 38–44. 
 22. C.E. art. 1, Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain) (“La Nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles 
de ambos hemisferios.”). 
 23. Id. art. 10. 
 24. Id. arts. 18–25. 
 25. Id. arts. 28–33. 
 26. Id. arts. 37, 61, 80. 
 27. Id. arts. 157–58. 
 28. Id. art. 222. 
 29. Id. art. 232. 
 30. Id. arts. 261(9), 268. 
 31. Id. art. 335(4). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Americans had significant representation in various political and 
representative bodies created during the period, including memberships in 
the Regency,32 as presidents, secretaries, and vice-presidents of the Cortes, 
in the Permanent Deputations, and on the committee that prepared the 
draft Constitution.33 No fewer than 47 deputies, representing overseas 
interests, out of a total of 183 signers, signed the Constitution.34 Of the 86 
deputies from the Americas, approximately one third (28) were trained 
lawyers.35 They fought diligently to increase the Americas’ power and 
influence in the Cortes, in the government, and in the text of the 
Constitution. Agustín de Argüelles, a key liberal figure in the Cortes and 
deputy for Asturias, proposed an early solution concerning American 
demands. He suggested that the decision of representation of America be 
suspended until the Constitution itself was finished, while advancing a 
decree assuring the equality of peninsular Spaniards and American 
Spaniards.36 Issues related to the Americas were often before the Cortes. 
There were speeches and debates concerning the indigenous communities 
(indios), various kinds of legal institutions to extract their wealth or labor 
(mitas and repartimientos), and a committee focused on the pacification of 
America.37 
American deputies at the Cortes were important contributors to the 
drafting of the Constitution. A site filled with ships and businesses, sailors 
and merchants, and cafés and traders at the time of the Constitution, Cádiz 
was a bustling economic hub with political institutions tied to foreign 
trade, and trade with the Americas in particular.38 In addition to the 
political and economic activities that tied the Americas to Cádiz, 
American financial contributions were essential in continuing the Spanish 
fight against the French.39 As Rieu-Millan has written, “[t]here was in 
Andalucía and especially in Cádiz an accentuated ‘presence’ of American 
Spaniards perfectly integrated into local life.”40 Nonetheless, the quality of 
 
 
 32. A regent served in place of the king. The Regency was the group of individuals serving as the 
representative of the king in his absence. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 6.  
 33. RAFAEL MARÍA DE LABRA, AMÉRICA Y LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1812, at 61–63 
(1914). 
 34. Id. at 63–64.  
 35. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 58.  
 36. DE LABRA, supra note 33, at 68–74. The decree was issued on October 15, 1810. The 
language may be found at ACTAS DE LAS SESIONES SECRETAS DE LAS CORTES GENERALES 
EXTRAORDINARIAS DE LA NACION ESPAÑOLA 19 (1874).  
 37. DE LABRA, supra note 33, at 74–84. 
 38. SOLÍS, supra note 1.  
 39. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 71.  
 40. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 66.  
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debate and overall consideration of the Americas in Cádiz suffered in 
several crucial respects due to a lack of knowledge and understanding 
about the current state of affairs in the Americas.41 American voices were 
respected and heard, but not always victorious, in the process of drafting 
and promulgating the Constitution.42  
About one hundred years ago, Rafael María de Labra began his study 
of the Americas and the Constitution with a detailed description of the 
content of the Recopilación.43 He was correct to begin with this source 
because the sources of Spanish colonial law, and especially the 
Recopilación, defined the manner in which the drafters of the Constitution 
understood the Americas. De Labra noted the traditional topics related to 
the Americas, the conversion of the indigenous inhabitants, transatlantic 
trade, and the Crown’s guidance of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
Americas, called the Real Patronato.44 Despite these distinctive features, 
there was also a juridical uniformity between the Spain of Europe and the 
Spain of the Americas.45 De Labra wrote:  
[i]t is quite certain that the fundamental bases of the totality of 
judicial life in the Spain of Europe and of America were the same: 
that there were considerable differences in the overseas legislation, 
in second place, determined by local and historical circumstances 
and that deprived in the entire colonial order an accentuated 
tendency of progressive assimilation of the colonial life to the 
metropolitan life, maintaining the unity of law in the entire Empire 
and the identity of the European Spaniard and the American 
Spaniard.46 
 
 
 41. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 69–74. There may have even been jealousy of the perceived 
ease of life in the Americas. For example, Agustín Argüelles during the debates on the Constitution 
spoke of the favorable climate of the Americas that leads to an increase in population where food 
grows with little cost or effort in comparison to the peninsula. AGUSTÍN DE ARGÜELLES, DISCURSOS 
176 (1995). In this way, a comparison may be made between the population of Cádiz and the French-
aligned Spaniards of Bayonne who had an even greater intellectual distance from America. Víctor Tau 
Anzoátegui, Las observaciones de Benito de la Mata Linares a la Constitución de Bayona, 178 
BOLETÍN DE LA REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA 243–66 (1981). 
 42. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 71–81. 
 43. DE LABRA, supra note 33. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 37. 
 46. Id. at 36–37 (“Y no es menos cierto que las bases fundamentales de la vida total jurídica de 
la España de Europa y de América eran lo mismo: que existisían [sic] en la legislación ultramarina 
diferencias considerables, de segundo orden, determinadas por circunstancias históricas y locales y 
que privaba en todo el orden colonial una acentuada tendencia de asimilación progresiva de la vida 
colonial à la Metropolítica, manteniendo la unidad del derecho en todo el Imperio y la identidad de 
español de Europa y de América.”). 
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The overarching understanding is one of legislative and cultural 
similarities, despite some differences, between both hemispheres of the 
Spanish empire. Spanish colonial law provided connective legal tissue 
between the parts of the empire. More specifically, Spanish colonial law 
provided a base of law concerning America for all the deputies in the 
Cortes during their deliberations and actions. De Labra’s use of the 
Recopilación illustrates this. Although at times the deputies wanted to 
change, and in fact changed much related to the Americas through the 
Constitution, Spanish colonial law remained the first source the drafters 
turned to for consultation on the relationship between the monarchy and 
the American territories. 
The proposals of the Cortes or of groups of deputies often required 
drastic changes in the governing legislation. For example, on the one hand, 
the proposals of the American deputies to modify restrictions on trade, 
agriculture, and mining were essentially a rejection of the established 
system under Spanish colonial law.47 On the other hand, the territorial 
organization of America under the Constitution maintained its structure 
from the pre-Constitutional epoch as modified by the innovations of the 
Constitution addressing institutional representatives.48 Additionally, 
Spanish colonial law informed the discussion on other fundamental 
institutional topics, such as the American highest courts of appeal 
(audiencias) and ecclesiastical administration.49 For the liberals in the 
Cortes, any difference in organization, laws, or representation might imply 
an intolerable inequality between parts of the empire, and the appearance 
of modification or change was to be avoided in furthering their agenda.50 
Spanish colonial law might provide a rule that continued without 
change during and after the Constitution. For example, considering the 
problem created by disperse indigenous populations across the American 
territories, the Overseas Commission presented a rule on April 22, 1813, 
that simply copied the rule already established as Order 159 on 
populations found in book six of the Recopilación:  
It is prohibited that individuals live away from towns and separated 
by the mountains and hills, depriving themselves of all spiritual and 
 
 
 47. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 175–218. 
 48. Id. at 219–53. 
 49. Id. at 253–62, 269. 
 50. Id. at 266–67. 
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bodily benefit, without the aid of help and which human necessity 
requires that men ought to give to each other.51 
According to Rieu-Millan, “[t]he Commission only proposed that the 
existing laws be enforced.”52 Even after the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, Spanish colonial law, in the form of the Recopilación, shaped 
peninsular ideas of the Americas within Spanish constitutional practices 
and texts.53 Because it served as a fundamental source of the rules, ideas, 
structures, and institutions related to the Americas, Spanish Colonial law 
was the first source that the deputies turned to when considering the 
Americas and their relationship to the Spanish Empire. This allowed the 
Cortes and the drafters in many instances to reassert general propositions 
about the law, rather than create a new system of governance with respect 
to the Americas. 
II. SPANISH COLONIAL LAW AS A SOLUTION TO A SPECIFIC  
QUESTION OF LAW 
Returning to Article 1 of the Constitution and its idea of “Spaniards of 
both hemispheres,” it must be noted that this text was, of course, a 
constitutional solution to a large and difficult problem. The moment 
Fernando VII renounced the throne in favor of Napoleonic occupation of 
the peninsula, the American colonies were without direction and clear 
leadership.54 On the one hand, the American colonies were provinces 
incorporated in the Kingdom of Castile, 
and the Castilian laws were common to them; and on the other 
hand, the Americas were considered themselves as an entity in 
which existed without prominence their differences of every 
kind. . . . Despite the clear tendency of the Bourbons to unity, it was 
not clear what was the true juridical and political condition of the 
different territories.55 
 
 
 51. Id. at 141 (“[S]e prohibe que los individuos vivan fuera del poblado y separados por las 
sierras y montes, privándose de todo beneficio espiritual y corporal, sin socorro de ministro y del que 
obligan las necesidades humanas que deben dar unos hombres a otros.”). Living apart and especially 
in mountains was not only an administrative difficulty for colonial rule but also challenged core 
aspects of assertions of sovereignty. LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND 
GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900, at 222–36 (2010). 
 52. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 141. 
 53. LORENTE, supra note 2, at 217–60.  
 54. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 61–62. 
 55. García Gallo, supra note 3, at 170 (“[y] las leyes castellanas eran comunes; y, por otra parte, 
se consideraban las Indias como una unidad en que quedaban sin relieve sus diferencias de toda clase 
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Despite three centuries of daily practice and an equal number of years 
of laws, decrees, and legal works, the precise status of the Americas 
remained a mystery. As a result of the French occupation of Spain and the 
political uncertainty created throughout the empire, the ill-defined status of 
the Americas surfaced in political and constitutional debate.56 
Spanish colonial law played an important role in the process of 
determining a political solution to the question of the status of the 
Americas. The juridical base for assertions of equality between both 
hemispheres can be found in the legislation concerning the Americas in 
Spanish colonial law.  
As Rieu-Millan states, 
On declaring that the overseas territories were “an integral part of 
the Spanish Monarchy,” the Cortes and before the Junta Central did 
nothing more than return to the first legislation on the Americas. . . . 
On asserting America’s non-colonial status, [the deputies] appeared 
to turn back to the letter of the Spanish colonial law and to renew 
the foundational period with the glorious past.57 
This was, of course, only one vision of the status of the Americas, 
complicated by the precarious military and economic situation of the entire 
Spanish Empire. Similarly, in his debates on the Constitution, Argüelles 
argued that the equal treatment the Americas received under the 
Constitution was inconsistent with labeling them “colonies.”58 
 
 
. . . no obstante la manifiesta tendencia de los Borbones a la unidad, no resultaba claro cuál fuese la 
verdadera condición jurídico-política de los distintos territorios.”). For a philological and historical 
study of the divisions and regions of America in this period, see Rafael Estrada Michel, Regnícolas 
Contra Provincialistas. Un Nuevo Acercamiento a Cádiz con Especial Referencia al Caso de la Nueva 
España, 6 REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DE HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL (Sept. 2005). 
 56. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 71–81. 
 57. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 96–97 (“Al declarar que los territorios de Ultramar eran 
‘parte integrante de la Monarquía española’ las Cortes y antes la Junta central no hicieron más que 
volver a la primer legislación indiana. . . . Al reclamar para América un estatuto no colonial, 
pretendían volver a la letra de la legislación indiana, y reanudar con el pasado glorioso del período 
fundacional.”). For more on the role of the Junta Central before the gathering of the Cortes, see 
Mirow, Visions, supra note 8, at 62–63. The classic study of derecho indiano leading to the conclusion 
that the Americas were not colonies is RICARDO LEVENE, LAS INDIAS NO ERAN COLONIAS (1951). An 
important recent economic analysis of the same question is Regina Grafe & Maria Alejandra Irigoin, 
The Spanish Empire and its Legacy: Fiscal Redistribution and Political Conflict in Colonial and Post-
colonial Spanish America, 1 J. GLOB. HIST. 241 (2006). For a discussion of recent literature 
concerning this question, see Estrada, Los Reinos, supra note 2. 
 58. ARGÜELLES, DISCURSOS, supra note 41, at 245. Argüelles states: 
En cuanto al otro punto de subsistir las Américas gobernadas segun el sistema colonial, solo 
apelo à la justificacion del Congreso. Una Constitucion que concede iguales derechos à 
todos los españoles libres; que establece una representacion nacional; que ha de juntarse 
todos los años à sancionar leyes, decretar contribuciones y levantar tropas; que erige un 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/7
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One deputy even found a specific legal answer to the entirely political 
question of the status of the Americas through the application of Spanish 
colonial law. On January 11, 1811, numerous deputies continued debates 
from January 9, 1811, concerning a proposition requiring equality of 
representation of the Americas at the Cortes as a result of the decree of 
October 15, 1810.59 Although most deputies considered only the political 
nature of the question, Deputy Morales Duárez of Lima found the solution 
in the Spanish colonial law: 
 America, since the conquest, and its indigenous peoples have 
enjoyed the special privileges of Castile. Listen to the words that 
finish the chapter of the laws from the year 1542, where the 
emperor Charles say this, “We want and order that the Indians be 
treated as our vassals of Castile, as they are.” With respect to this 
decision, there was made years prior in Barcelona a declaration in 
September 1529 (that resulted in law 1, title 1 of book 3 of the 
Recopilation of the Indies), where it says that the Americas are 
incorporated and united to the Crown of Castile, according to the 
intentions of Pope Alexander VI, whose title recounts, as the most 
opportune of those considered for the legal sovereignty over those 
dominions.  
 We ought to say aloud these words “incorporated and united” to 
understand that the provinces of America are not the slave or 
vassals of the provinces of Spain; they have been and are provinces 
of Castile, with the same special privileges and honors.60 
 
 
Consejo de Estado compuesto de europeos y americanos, y que fija la administracion de 
justicia de tal modo, que bajo de ningun pretesto tengan que venir estos à litigar en la 
Península; una Constitucion, digo, que reposa sobre estas bases ¿es compatible con un 
régimen colonial? 
Id. 
 59. 1 DIARIO DE SESIONES DE LAS CORTES GENERALES Y EXTRAORDINARIAS 353 (1870). 
 60. Id.  
La América desde la conquista, y sus indígenas, han gozado los fueros de Castilla. Oiganse 
las palabras con que termina un capítulo de las leyes tituladas de año de 1542, donde el 
emperador Cárlos así habla: ‘Queremos y mandamos que sean tratados los indios como 
vasallos nuestros de Castilla, pues lo son.’ Con respecto à esta justicia, habia hecho años 
antes en Barcelona una declaracion en Setiembre de 1529 (que dió mérito à la ley1a, título I 
del libro 3o de la Recopilacion de Indias), donde dice que las Américas son incorporadas y 
unidas à la Corona de Castilla, conforme à las intenciones del Papa Alejandro VI, cuyo título 
allí recuerda, como el más oportuno de cuantos sea legal para la soberanía sobre aquellos 
dominios. 
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This is the kind of argument one might expect from a doctor of both 
civil and canon laws and chaired professor of the University of San 
Marcos in Lima.61 Deputy Morales Duárez’s analysis was based on the 
various sources of the Spanish colonial law as incorporated into the 
Recopilación. He displayed and used his knowledge of the applicable 
legislation to reach a conclusion on the question presented. Thus, Spanish 
colonial law provided important evidence concerning the pressing political 
question of the status of the Americas. It was the first source that members 
of the Cortes, from both hemispheres, turned to for an answer. 
Shortly after establishing the equality of the Americas under a decree 
of October 15, 1810, the Cortes ironically had to consider an 
administrative system for the overseas territories (Ultramar). The process 
of creating an administrative structure for the Americas revealed and 
exacerbated the extant differences between the Americas and the 
peninsula. In the end, the Secretary of the Office of the Government of the 
Kingdom for Overseas became the government organ charged with 
commerce, the geographic extension, the fiscal and tax regime, and the 
rules, laws, and other complex aspects with respect to the American 
territories.62 Despite the equality of the Americas, their exceptional quality 
was also a reality.63 
In the course of setting out the fundamental differences between the 
Americas and the peninsula, one of the largest debates centered on the 
exclusion of people of African descent and the inclusion of indigenous 
Americans as Spaniards receiving representation under the Constitution.64 
Spanish colonial law also played a role in these determinations. To be a 
Spaniard, one had to have free status. Spanish colonial law, as expressed 
in the Leyes Nuevas of 1526 to 1549, as found in Book 6 of the 
Recopilación, prohibited the servitude of indigenous peoples.65 Thus, one 
source of Spanish colonial law indicated that indigenous people were free 
when considering the requirements for being a Spaniard. On January 11, 
 
 
Debe hacerse alto en esas palabras incorporadas y unidas, para entender que las provincias 
de América no han sido ni son esclavas ó vasallas de las provincias de España; han sido y 
son cono unas provincias de Castilla, con sus mismos fueros y honores. 
Id. 
 61. Los Diputados Doceanistas: Morales Duarez, Vicente, CÁDIZ 2012: CAPITAL 
IBEROAMERICANA DE LA CULTURA 2012, http://www.cadiz2012.es/diputados_detalle.asp?id=16&letra 
=m (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 62. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 295–99. 
 63. See id. at 295–99. 
 64. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 75–76. 
 65. DE LABRA, supra note 33, at 110–16. This was, of course, contrary to a standard practice of 
exploitation in the Americas. See MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 18, at 84–91. 
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1811, the Cortes debated this provision. In the face of opposition, the jurist 
Morales Duárez of Lima again used various Spanish authors and sources 
of Spanish colonial law to argue that indigenous peoples had the legal 
capacity to be Spaniards.66 In addition to the well-known literature of 
Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Morales Duárez 
cited Solórzano to underscore the role and importance that indigenous 
people had in the monarchy as a whole.67 Morales Duárez added that 
according to the Recopilación and a decree of September, 1529, “the 
Americas are ‘incorporated and united to the Crown of Castile’ and their 
primitive natural people are subjects of the Crown of Castile.”68 
Furthermore, the requirements of legal residence (being a vecino) to have 
the status of citizen were defined by provisions in Spanish sources as 
varied as the Siete Partidas from the thirteenth century and Novísima 
Recopilación of the early nineteenth century.69 Similarly, Agustín 
Argüelles turned to Spanish colonial law to clarify the legal status of 
America’s indigenous people by citing provisions of the Recopilación of 
1680 that removed indigenous populations from the supervision of the 
Inquisition.70 Spanish colonial law, however, contained little that could 
elevate the status of free blacks or slaves.71 This argument that slavery 
only existed for blacks and mulattos was used to support the free status of 
indigenous people.72 
 
 
 66. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 113–14. 
 67. Id. at 113–15. 
 68. Id. at 114. 
 69. DE LABRA, supra note 33, at 145–46. For more on the Siete Partidas and the Novísima 
Recopilación, see MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 18, at 49–53. 
 70. 1 AGUSTÍN DE ARGÜELLES, EXÁMEN HISTÓRICO DE LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL 336–37 
(Lóndres, Imprenta de Carlos Wood ed., 1835) [hereinafter ARGÜELLES, EXÁMEN HISTÓRICO DE LA 
REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL]. 
 71. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 147, 157. 
 72. DE LABRA, supra note 33, at 110–16. Nonetheless, this does not mean that slavery was not an 
issue debated at the Cortes. José Miguel Guridi Alcócer and Augstín Argüelles spoke about slavery 
and the slave trade. Id. at 127–33. Some scholars in the United States oddly associate the Constitution 
with the abolition of legal or social racism. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Identity, Democracy, 
Communicative Power, Inter/national Labor Rights and the Evolution of Latcrit Theory and 
Community, 53 MIAMI L. REV. 575, 619 n.99 (1999) (stating that Martha Menchaca, Chicano 
Indianism: A Historical Account of Racial Representation in the United States, as reprinted in THE 
LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1998), 
“recount[s] how racial caste system was dismantled in Mexico by the 1812 Spanish Constitution of 
Cadiz.”); Taunya Lovell Banks, Mestizaje and the Mexican Mestizo Self: No hay Sangre Negra, So 
there is no Blackness, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 119, 214 (2006) (“The 1812 Spanish Constitution of 
Cadiz abolished the casta system and accompanying racial laws.”) (citing Martha Menchaca, Chicano 
Indianism: A Historical Account of Racial Representation in the United States, 20 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 
583, 586 (1993)). For a more tempered, and more accurate, reading of the articles of the Constitution 
of Cádiz as they relate to race, see Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 
6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 16–18 (2000); see also Nilda Garay Montañez, La idea de igualdad en el 
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American deputies at the Cortes educated the members of the Cortes on 
how Spanish colonial law functioned in the Americas. Rieu-Millan 
provides a telling example from the debates on March 30, 1811.73 When 
the Viceroy of Mexico abolished tribute for indigenous people, he wanted 
to re-introduce the institution of the repartimiento, a system of forced 
labor quotas and economic extraction placed on indigenous populations, as 
a manner of compensating those who had previously benefited from the 
payment of tribute.74 When some deputies stated that they knew nothing 
about the nature of a repartimiento, other American deputies spoke to 
explain the institution, and the Peruvian deputy Feliú provided a short 
discourse on the topic.75 Repartimientos were not reintroduced.76 
Similarly, on another occasion, during a debate concerning the abolition of 
the mita, another form of forced indigenous labor, José Joaquín Olmedo, 
the deputy from Guayaquil, cited passages from the classic work on 
Spanish colonial law, Solórzano’s Política Indiana, to explain the 
institution.77 
A final example may be drawn again from Morales Duárez, who 
argued in defense of the decision to “pay priests with the nine-tenths 
[taxes] of the king and additionally with the treasury of Lima.”78 In 
defending this fiscal position, Morales Duárez lectured the Cortes on the 
applicable provisions of the Recopilación, his personal experiences with 
the topic, and the practices of Viceroy Toledo in Peru during the sixteenth 
century.79 
There are surely other examples. In resolving questions as diverse as 
the status of indigenous peoples, the imposition of forms of forced labor in 
the Americas, and fiscal considerations in the empire, the Cortes turned to 
Spanish colonial law as a source for particular established rules and 
guides. The pervasive influence of the Spanish colonial law in the Cortes 
on topics touching the Americas is noteworthy. Spanish colonial law also 
affected broader questions of exactly how to draft a constitution and how 
closely the text of the Constitution reflected existing pre-Constitutional 
legislation and practices. 
 
 
constitucionalismo liberal español: lo racial, las castas y lo indígena en la Constitución de 1812, 69–
70 CUADERNOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE LA CÁTEDRA FADRIQUE FURIÓ CERIOL 129–58 (2012). 
 73. RIEU-MILLAN, supra note 16, at 80. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 124 (debate of Oct. 21, 1812).  
 78. Id. at 80. 
 79. Id. (Toledo in Peru 1569, debate of June 20, 1811). 
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III. SPANISH COLONIAL LAW IN THE DEBATES ON THE HISTORICITY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 
Spanish colonial law was also used to justify the constitutional process 
and certain provisions of the Constitution itself. Thus, past historical 
practices and texts that were part of the Spanish colonial law were invoked 
in making a constitution. This process was often accompanied by the 
assertion that the Constitution itself contained or proposed nothing new.80 
The search for the historicity of the Constitution was much more than an 
after the fact attempt to justify the text.81 Of course, the search for 
historicity was part of the self-deception the deputies in the Cortes 
perpetrated on themselves. Historicity was important to them in that it was 
more than just a simple manner to introduce unexpected new ideas into the 
Constitution.82  
Political actors sought to justify their actions by relying on established 
legal authorities and past practices. Otherwise, they could have been 
subject to charges of treason and revolution for forming governing juntas, 
asserting royal authority through a regency, or purporting to act on behalf 
of an absent king.83 There was nothing novel about this method of 
justifying one’s actions in the midst of political change.84 The reforms 
brought by the Cortes and the Constitution were grounded in, or at least 
asserted to be grounded in, past practices, accepted legal texts, and Spain’s 
historical and political experiences.85 From these sources, the Cortes 
sought to construct an unwritten constitution for the Spanish Monarchy 
that would set out the compromises reached in allocating political power 
and its exercise.86 Jaime Rodríguez has expressed the view that using such 
sources as justification in the drafting of the Constitution was little more 
 
 
 80. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 66–67. 
 81. In this context, historicity should be understood to mean that an action is consistent with and 
based on genuine antecedents in a true existing tradition, rather than the product of convenient 
fabrication. This and the following three paragraphs are based on Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 66–
67. 
 82. See CARLOS GARRIGA & MARTA LORENTE, CÁDIZ, 1812: LA CONSTITUCIÓN 
JURISDICCIONAL 15–168 (2007); LORENTE, supra note 2, at 19–46, 135–83. 
 83. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 66. 
 84. See JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1993). 
 85. See infra notes 93–155 and accompanying text. 
 86. The classic work on the relationship between history and unwritten constitutions, in the 
English context, is J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, A REISSUE WITH RETROSPECT 
(1987). 
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than a historical fiction.87 Nonetheless, this process of justification was 
important because it provided the intellectual and rhetorical basis upon 
which sweeping changes were permitted. This was particularly true in the 
Americas where, for example, Spain’s unwritten constitution was seen as 
including American rights established by Spanish colonial law.88 
Proponents of draft proposals and new constitutional provisions 
grounded their ideas in the “historical constitution of the Monarchy.”89 To 
support the creation of a Regency during the absence of the king, those 
forming the institution turned to the Siete Partidas.90 In a move likely 
calculated to stymie innovation in the Constitution, the Sevilian lawyer 
and deputy Francisco Gómez Fernández suggested that each article cite the 
established Spanish law that justified it or that it modified, to ensure the 
historicity of the text.91 This proposition was voted down, but it illustrates 
the importance of historical justification and its political use in the drafting 
process.92 While each individual constitutional provision was not linked to 
established Spanish law, as a general principle, statements tying the 
Cortes’ activities and the Constitution’s text to Spain’s ancient constitution 
contributed to the Cortes’ acceptance of radical changes in the text of the 
Constitution. 
Historical justification had an important function after the text of the 
Constitution was completed. To explain the text, the Cortes appointed 
Agustín Argüelles and José Espiga y Gadea to draft an Introduction 
(Discurso preliminar), which was most likely written principally by 
Agustín Argüelles.93 The main reason for this Introduction was to 
demonstrate the Constitution‘s conformity with the established laws of 
Spain.94 Artola exposed well the polemical use of history evoked to justify 
novelties within the text. He wrote,  
[t]o legitimate political novelties, the author of the Introduction 
went to propositions taken from texts from whatever past time, 
 
 
 87. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 46–48. 
 88. Id. at 46. 
 89. Miguel Artola, Estudio Preliminar, in II LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1812, at 40–41 (Miguel Artola 
& Rafael Flaquer Montequi eds., 2008). 
 90. Id. at 21. 
 91. Los Diputados Doceanistas: Gómez Fernández, Francisco, CÁDIZ 2012: CAPITAL 
IBEROAMERICANA DE LA CULTURA 2012, http://www.cadiz2012.es/diputados.asp?id=189&letra=g 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 92. Artola, supra note 89, at 64–65.  
 93. Id. at 59; DE LABRA, supra note 33, at 89, 91. Concerning the joint authorship of the 
Introduction and, in fact, its nature as a collective work of a committee, see Franciso Tomás y 
Valiente, Estudio Preliminar, in ARGÜELLES, DISCURSOS, supra note 41, at xvii. 
 94. Artola, supra note 89, at 59. 
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without worrying himself about the changes brought over an 
interval of centuries. The election of Gothic kings is the argument to 
justify national sovereignty.95 
Artola asked the reader to consider how anything but fancifully interpreted 
Spanish historical material could be put forth as justification for 
constitutional innovations. These included representative elections with 
nearly universal male suffrage, assertions of natural rights to liberty and 
property, the creation of uniform legal codes to be applied to all, the 
abolition of special privileges, and the suggestion that juries might be used 
in trials.96 Historians have determined that in rare and attenuated instances, 
some of the developments that came about after the French invasion were 
broadly based on existing Hispanic thought, but not with the kind of 
specificity and exactitude the drafters of the Constitution asserted.97 
History was used, in the words of Estrada, “more as a unifying myth than 
an effective guide,”98 and indeed deputies were willing to ground their 
reforms in practical approaches and rational decisions that had nothing to 
do with being bound by historical practice or text.99 Nevertheless, such 
historical claims were viewed as essential to produce a text that would find 
the Cortes’ approval.100 Argüelles’s Introduction is an important document 
to examine this desire to base the text in historical antecedents, especially 
in light of Spanish colonial law. 
The Introduction to the Constitution is longer than the Constitution 
itself. In the Introduction, the importance of the Americas and Spanish 
overseas territories abuts the justifications of the Constitution’s historicity. 
The Introduction attempts to present the Constitution as a simple 
manifestation of the existing Spanish juridical tradition.101 The authors of 
the Introduction state that the Constitution followed the “fundamental laws 
of Aragón, of Navarra, and of Castile,” and that it had only abandoned the 
 
 
 95. Id. (“Para legitimar las novedades políticas, el autor del Discurso acudió a proposiciones 
que tomaba de textos de cualquier tiemo pasado, sin preocuparse de los cambios producidos en el 
intervalo de los siglos. La elección de los reyes godos es el argumento para justificar la soberanía 
nacional.”). 
 96. Id. at 60–63, 67. 
 97. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3.  
 98. ESTRADA, MONARQUÍA Y NACIÓN, supra note 2, at 401. 
 99. Id. at 402.  
 100. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 66–67. Goméz Fernández’s proposal to base every article of 
the Constitution on an established law or provision has already been noted. Debate on Art. I (Aug. 25, 
1811), in II LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1812, supra note 89, at 317–18. 
 101. Discurso Preliminar, in RAFAEL GARÓFANO SÁNCHEZ & JUAN RAMÓN DE PÁRAMO, LA 
CONSTITUCIÓN GADITANA DE 1812, at 59 (1987) [hereinafter Discurso Preliminar]. 
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structure of these classical works of public law.102 In fact, the Introduction 
asserted that if one saw innovation or novel ideas in the Constitution, this 
would only be the result of not knowing sufficiently “the history and 
ancient legislation of Spain.”103 The Introduction continued this assertion 
by suggesting that one may find almost everything in the new Constitution 
in the older works of Blancas (author of a chronicle of Aragón), of Alonso 
Zorita (an author with substantial practical legal experience in the 
Americas), of Pedro Mártir de Anglería (a chronicler and member of the 
Council of the Indies), and of Juan de Mariana (a Jesuit historian).104 
For example, the Introduction notes that the Constitution limits the 
power of the king while making reference to the Fuero Juzgo and the laws 
of Aragón, Navarra, and Castile.105 The entire Constitution is presented as 
a compilation of Spanish public law from the “immense collection of the 
body of the law that forms Spanish jurisprudence” found in the Gothic 
codes and in the various sources of ancient Castilian and Spanish law 
including the “Fuero Juzgo, las Siete Partidas, Fuero Viejo, Ordenamiento 
de Alcalá, Ordenamiento Real y Nueva Recopilación.”106 The Introduction 
concludes that “[w]hen the Commission says that in its draft there is 
nothing new, it speaks an uncontestable truth, because truly there is 
nothing new in substance.”107 To assure the historicity of the Constitution, 
the Introduction speaks of another commission that compiled all the 
pertinent legislation on structural and constitutional issues. The Cortes was 
to use these materials as guides for their “nature and spirit” and as 
evidence of laws that continue to advance the common interest.108 
 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 60. 
 104. Id. at 61. Of those sources listed, Zorita had the closest ties to Spanish colonial law. Having 
studied law in Salamanca, he later worked in the highest courts of Santo Domingo, Guatemala, and 
Mexico. He compiled laws related to the Americas in his Compilación para las Indias en general 
(1574). MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 18, at 43, 46. See generally RALPH VIGIL, 
ALONSO ZORITA: ROYAL JUDGE AND CHRISTIAN HUMANIST, 1512–1585 (1987). For a brief discussion 
of the Fuero Juzgo, known in various forms as the Breviary of Alaric, the Lex Romana Visigothorum, 
or the Liber Judiciorum, and its place in Spanish law, see MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 
18, at 15–16. 
 105. Discurso Preliminar, supra note 101, at 61–64. 
 106. Id. at 65, 108.  
 107. Id. at 65 (“Cuando la Comisión dice que en su proyecto no hay nada nuevo, dice una verdad 
incontrastable, porque realmente no lo hay en la sustancia.”). 
 108. Id. at 65, 66. This is probably Reunión de las Leyes Fundamentales de la Monarquía 
Española, Clasificadas por el Método que Prescribe la Instrucción Formada por la Comisión de 
Cortes para Arreglar y Dirigir los Trabajos de la Junta de Legislación en los Párrafos 7 y 9, ACTAS 
DE LA JUNTA DE LEGISLACION, ACUERDO 12 (Dec. 10, 1809), available at http://www.cervantesvirtual 
.com/obra-visor/actas-de-la-junta-de-legislacion-octubre-1809enero-1810--0/html/02305a12-82b2-11d 
f-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html#I_13. 
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The emphasis on the Americas differs between the text of the 
Constitution and the Introduction. Although there is an obvious 
parallelism in the discussion of the various themes of the two documents, 
the Introduction clarifies the topics that elicited the most debate or 
disagreement within the Cortes. The Introduction also uses the 
incorporation of the Americas into the nation as an excuse or justification 
to introduce changes or novelties.109 For example, in discussing the theme 
of rejecting citizenship for slaves and people originating in Africa, the 
Introduction notes that the situation stems from the prevalence of slaves 
and Africans in the Americas.110 In fact, it is within this context that one 
finds for the first time in the Introduction the word “ultramar.”111 The 
Introduction also noted the numerous vacant positions in the Americas and 
explained that the system of representation codified in the Constitution 
reflects the difficulties that American deputies faced with an overriding 
policy of “narrowing more and more the ties of union with overseas 
Spaniards.”112 
A further investigation into the relationship between Spanish colonial 
law and the Constitution leads one to the writings and thoughts of Agustín 
Argüelles, beyond his comments in the Introduction to the Constitution. 
Argüelles was an important voice on these matters in the Cortes.113 
Although Argüelles is not representative of the deputies in the Cortes in all 
respects, any study of the topic must take note of his Introduction, 
writings, and activities within the Cortes, and their subsequent history.  
Argüelles was born in Ribadesella, Asturias in 1776 and studied law at 
the University of Oviedo.114 By his mid-twenties, he benefitted from the 
protection of Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, an important Spanish 
enlightenment thinker and politician of the time.115 He was a secretary to 
the Bishop of Barcelona, and by 1805 he had an official position with the 
Ministry of State.116 A year later, he was sent on a diplomatic mission to 
London, where he remained for three years.117 His first period of residence 
in England was to be highly influential in Argüelles’s understanding of 
 
 
 109. Discurso Preliminar, supra note 101, at 69–73. 
 110. Id. at 69. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 71–74, 101. 
 113. Mirow, Visions, supra note 5, at 69. 
 114. Francisco Tomás y Valiente, Estudio Preliminar, in ARGÜELLES, DISCURSOS, supra note 41, 
at xix. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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political and constitutional function and structure.118 He befriended Lord 
Holland, whose activities were an important influence on the Cádiz 
process and returned to Seville, Spain in 1809.119 In Seville, he served as 
secretary to the Commission of Legislation of the Cortes.120 This position 
acquainted him with all the political and structural aspects of the Central 
Junta’s government of Spain during the French occupation.121 Lessons 
learned in the Commission of Legislation were directly applicable to his 
service on the Constitutional Commission, which issued the text of the 
Constitution.122 His membership in the Cortes was as a deputy for 
Asturias.123 After spending 1823 to 1834 in London,124 he died in Madrid 
on March 23, 1844.125 
Argüelles was very active in the process of drafting the Constitution 
and was, as mentioned earlier, most likely the primary author of the 
Introduction, discussed above as a foundational document in asserting the 
historicity of the Constitution. Despite being one of the most notable 
liberals among the deputies to the Cortes—and, therefore, one of the 
deputies most anxious for great changes in the new Constitution—he was 
also conscious of the historicity of the text of the Constitution and of the 
Cortes’ emphasis on historical justifications.126 At times, he was a 
historian in the Cortes and of the Cortes, but above all Argüelles was a 
politician,127 a deputy,128 and a man of the state.129 Nonetheless, as noted 
Spanish legal historian Tomás y Valiente wrote of him, “Argüelles never 
fought without turning to history.”130 
Using history and having a well-developed appreciation of historical 
distance are, of course, two different things. Argüelles’s invocation of 
history has been subject to scrutiny by historians who have questioned his 
sincerity in his use of the past. For example, Tomás y Valiente concluded 
that Argüelles lacked historical consciousness and thus was a convenient 
 
 
 118. Id. at xix–xx. 
 119. Id. at xx. 
 120. Id. at xxi. 
 121. Id.  
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 123. Id. at xxi–xxii. 
 124. Id. at xxvi. 
 125. Id. at xxv. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at xi. 
 128. Id. at xxi–xxii. 
 129. Id. at lxxix.  
 130. Id. at xlvi (“Argüelles nunca combate sin recurrir a la historia.”). 
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presentist in his use of these sources.131 Tomás y Valiente viewed 
Argüelles as employing history in a political way to calm the fears of those 
facing change and to construct a mythic constitutional history of Spain that 
comported with his new constitutional goals.132 
Argüelles was also cognizant of the American cause from a European 
perspective and participated in the secret sessions of the Cortes that 
produced the famous decree of equality between the hemispheres.133 His 
close involvement with these central texts and questions makes his works 
a useful point of entry to study the relationship between Spanish colonial 
law and the Constitution.134 
In his Exámen Histórico de la Reforma Constitucional (Historical 
Examination of the Constitutional Reform), published in London in 1835, 
Argüelles, as one always turning to history, noted that the subsequent 
successes of independence in America complicated the analysis of what in 
truth had transpired in America before and during the Cortes.135 In fact, 
Argüelles noted that the situations in the Americas and on the peninsula 
were “not foreseen by the code of the Indias and even less by the tribunals 
and councils that until then guided and governed them.”136 Nonetheless, 
his analysis is based on his interpretation of Spanish colonial law and what 
it says about the relationship between the two hemispheres.  
For Argüelles, Spanish colonial law demonstrated the equality of the 
Americas and the peninsula in the Spanish nation. He stated,  
Spain gave to America everything it had, without the slightest 
holding back for itself. The same civil and criminal legislation, the 
same structure in the municipal order of the cities, in the 
administration of the provinces, the same structure of general 
education, the same rules for public instruction, the same 
participation in ecclesiastical dignities and offices of all levels, in 
 
 
 131. Id. at lxxi (“[A] Argüelles le falta por completo sensibilidad histórica. . . . [[A]rgüelles 
completely lacks historical sensibility . . . .]”). 
 132. Id. at lxxii–lxxiii. 
 133. ACTAS DE LAS SESIONES SECRETAS DE LAS CORTES GENERALES EXTRAORDINARIAS DE LA 
NACION ESPAÑOLA 16 (1874); Tomás y Valiente, Estudio Preliminar, in ARGÜELLES, DISCURSOS, 
supra note 41, at xxiii; see also Albert Dérozier, Argüelles y la cuestión de América ante las Cortes de 
Cádiz de 1810–1814, HOMENAJE A NOËL SALOMON, ILUSTRACIÓN ESPAÑOLA E INDEPENDENCIA DE 
AMÉRICA 159–64 (Alberto Gil Movales ed., 1979). 
 134. Dérozier, supra note 133. He does not mention the role of Spanish colonial law in 
Argüelles’s thought. Id. 
 135. ARGÜELLES, EXÁMEN HISTÓRICO DE LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 70, at 332. 
 136. Id. at 333 (“[N]o previsto en el código de Indias, y ménos aun por los tribunales y consejos 
que hasta aquella éra la dirigieron y gobernaron.”).  
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legal positions, the highest offices and positions of the state, in 
titles, honors, and commendations that were used in all times.137 
Thus, Argüelles’s starting point is one of absolute equality between the 
Americas and the peninsula. 
Nonetheless, the region required legislative exceptions that took 
account of the unique population and situation of America. Despite these 
variations, Argüelles’ summary of the institutions and law of the Americas 
led him to the conclusion that there was not “a premeditated design in the 
mother country to oppress the colonies.”138 On the contrary, the well-being 
of America was always on the mind of the peninsula when reforming laws 
or imposing taxes.139 For example, Argüelles tried to explain the reasons 
for prohibiting the cultivation of certain fruits and for Spain’s close control 
and monitoring of trade in the Americas.140 He stated, “[i]n sum, the 
Spanish Monarchy, in the peninsula and overseas, presented the same 
appearance, a system of, in theory, equal, uniform, and perfectly impartial 
government.”141 
In reaching this conclusion, Argüelles said, as a skilled historian might, 
that the moment to compare the Americas and the peninsula must be 1808, 
not before or after.142 Argüelles depicted the Americas as a society equal 
to that of the peninsula, full of wonders attributable to its colonization by 
Spain: cities, fortifications, roads, civil establishments, churches, scientific 
and literary groups, agriculture, commerce, and mines.143 If the Americas 
suffered from a lack of liberty and the strangling oppression of a 
suffocating government in 1808, then the peninsula suffered the same 
horrible circumstances. The two regions suffered the same abuses and 
encountered the same worries. The blame was not on the metropole for its 
actions against the colonies; this was simply a horrible time for all regions 
 
 
 137. Id. at 335–36.  
España dió á la América todo lo que le había quedado, sin hacer la menor reserva para sí. 
La misma legislacion civil y criminal, la misma planta en el órden municipal de los pueblos, 
en el método administrativo de las provincias, el mismo plan de educacion general, los 
mismos reglamentos de enseñanza pública, la mismo participacion en las dignidades y 
beneficios eclesiásticos de todas gerarquías, en las magistraturas, empleos y cargos 
supremos del estado, en los títulos, honores y condecoraciones que se usaron en todas 
épocas. 
Id. 
 138. Id. at 338 (“[D]esignio premeditado en la madre patria de oprimir á las colonias.”).  
 139. Id. at 339. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 340 (“En suma, la monarquía de España, en la península y Ultramar, presentaba el 
mismo aspecto, un sistema de gobierno igual, uniforme, perfectamente imparcial en su teoría.”). 
 142. Id. at 341. 
 143. Id. at 342–43. 
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of Spain.144 In fact, in his estimation, America escaped much of the 
hardship because of its geographic distance from the peninsula. For 
example, Argüelles stated that there was “deliberate oppression imposed 
upon the metropole with the end of justifying the conduct of America 
during the constitutional reform.”145 Additionally, the Americas had the 
luxury of being far away from the battles on the peninsula in the war of 
independence against the French.146 
For Argüelles, the decree of October 15, 1810, in which the Central 
Junta declared the equality of American and European Spaniards, was an 
extension of the political and historical relationship that had always 
existed between the two hemispheres of the Spains. Equality between the 
Americas and the peninsula was something Argüelles observed as flowing 
from Spanish colonial law and expressed in colonial institutions. Although 
this relationship was not an innovation for Spain, Spain was the innovator 
in establishing this kind of equality across the ocean. “The equality of 
political rights given to America was in reality an innovation in the 
colonial system of the nations of Europe. The Cortes were unfortunately 
unable to have the benefit of any practical example to guide them in this 
experiment.”147 History, according to Argüelles, demonstrated that Spain 
was “constant in considering its colonies as all the provinces of the 
monarchy.”148 
What annoyed Argüelles was that although the provinces of America 
received this equal status, in effect, they received special treatment “as if 
[they] had different interests from those of the metropole and ought to 
deserve greater care, more attention, and more consideration than the other 
provinces of the monarchy.”149 Argüelles was infuriated by a 
communication from the Puebla de los Angeles deputy who, without great 
political sense, requested the creation of a commission to begin the 
independence process for Mexico.150 
 
 
 144. Id. at 343–44. 
 145. Id. at 345–46 (“[O]presion deliberada hecho contra la metrópoli á fin de justificar la 
conducta de América durante la reforma constitucional.”). 
 146. Id. at 224, 346–50. 
 147. Id. at 356–57 (“La igualdad de derechos políticos concedida á la América era en realidad 
una innovacion en el sistema colonial de las naciones de Europa. Por desgracia, las Córtes no podían 
aprovecharse de ningun ejemplo práctico que las guiase en su esperimento.”). 
 148. Id. at 359 (“[C]onstante en considerar á sus colonias como á todas las provincias de la 
monarquía.”). 
 149. Id. at 243 (“[S]i tuviese intereses distintos de los de la metrópoli y debiese merecer más 
cuidado, más atención y más esmero que las demás provincias de la monarquía.”).  
 150. Id. at 246–47.  
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Furthermore, the assertion that the decree of October 15, 1810, applied 
to the General and Extraordinary Cortes and not just the Constitutional 
Cortes was a rejection of the promise the Cortes had solemnly and 
publicly made151 and that resulted in a vote of 69 to 61 not to change the 
composition of the General and Extraordinary Cortes.152 Argüelles 
considered complaints about trade and taxes in relation to the decree that 
established equality in profession between Americans, indigenous peoples 
(indios), and Spaniards to be grand examples of ingratitude on the part of 
the American deputies.153 
Of course, most of the assertions that nothing had changed were false. 
A true understanding of events and ideas reveals that constitutional 
historicity and American equality were rhetorical tropes employed for 
concrete political purposes. Concerning the new regime of government in 
the provinces of America, García Gallo wrote that, 
[t]he activities of these new organs of government were almost 
always revolutionary. The Central Junta, the Council of Regency or 
the Cortes of Cádiz legislated in respect to the New World in 
manifest disparity with the fundamental principles of the laws of the 
Indies. The decrees of the Cortes concerning America profoundly 
changed the system of the prior government, the same for those 
decreed for the peninsula, no less innovative than the laws of José 
Bonaparte. The revolution functioning in the subject of public law 
of the Americas was no less in the decrees of the Cortes of Cádiz 
than those of the American juntas.154 
Depending on the moment and the argument to be made, Argüelles 
might concede that much had changed. Appearing to contradict the 
position asserted in his later historical examination of the Cortes and the 
Constitution, he stated during the debates: “Congress, on destroying the 
colonial system of the Americas, has thrown away the basis of their 
 
 
 151. Id. at 253. 
 152. Id. at 255.  
 153. Id. at 257.  
 154. García Gallo, supra note 3, at 170. 
También fué revolucionaria casi siempre la actuación de estos nuevos órganos de gobierno. 
La Junta Central, el Consejo de Regencia o las Cortes de Cádiz legislaron respecto del 
Nuevo Mundo en manifiesta disparidad con lo preceptuado en las leyes de Indias. Los 
decretos de las Cortes referentes a América alteraron profundamente el sistema de gobierno 
anterior, lo mismo que los dictados para la Península, no menos innovadores que los del rey 
José Bonaparte. La revolución operada en materias de Derecho público indiano no fué 
menor en los decretos de las Cortes de Cádiz que en los de las Juntas americanas. 
Id.  
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prosperity. All legislation dealing with the Americas will be 
fundamentally altered by the bases of this Constitution.”155 The rhetoric of 
historicism went back and forth depending on the political moment and the 
argument to be won.  
In these ways, Spanish colonial law was brought into the broader 
debate concerning the way history and historical sources were used to 
justify the content of the Constitution. Although the general problem of 
the historicity of the Constitution went far beyond the place of the 
Americas within the empire, the intellectual and historical foundations of 
the legal and constitutional place of these territories were especially 
subject to this scrutiny and framework. Argüelles explored this topic in 
relation to the Americas at various points in his work on the Constitution 
and its historicity. Providing extant structures and legal definitions, 
Spanish colonial law was widely deployed in debates asserting the 
historicity of the Constitution and the status of the Americas. 
Constitutional drafting occurs in a political atmosphere that often 
draws on pre-constitutional law in the process. Change is shrouded in 
continuity, as pre-constitutional law is used to define relationships, rights, 
institutions, and the limits and statuses of members and actors. Spanish 
colonial law (derecho indiano) was employed in various modes 
throughout this process and provided a general backdrop of the legal and 
political world against which constitutional texts would be played. It was 
also invoked to answer specific questions that arose in the context of 
constitutional debate and drafting, and finally, was appropriated in the 
battles over the historicity of the Constitution. In Cádiz, the Constitution 
was the product of pre-constitutional law in rhetoric, in fact, and in myth. 
 
 
 155. ARGÜELLES, DISCURSOS, supra note 41, at 207 (“El Congreso, al destruir el sistema colonial 
de las Américas, ha echado los fundamentos de su prosperidad. Toda la legislacion de Indias va à ser 
alterada por las bases de esta Constitucion.”). 
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